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Albstract
This paper  studies the effects of contagion on bank  lending  spreads
and  output  fluctuations  in Argentina.  The first part  presents  the  an-
alytical framework,  which analyzes the  determination  of bank lending
spreads  in the  presence  of verification  and  enforcement  costs  of loan
contracts.  The second part  presents  estimates  of a vector  autoregres-
sion model  that  relates  bank  leniding spreads,  the  cyclical component
of output,  the  real  bank  lending  rate,  and  the  external  interest  rate
spread.  Using generalized  impulse  response functions,  a  positive  his-
torical shock in external  spreads  is shown to lead to an increase  in do-
mestic  spreads  and  a reduction  in the  cyclical component  of output-
as predicted  by our  analytical  framework.  Historical  decompositions
indicate  that  shocks  to  external  spreads  in  the  immediate  aftermath
of the Mexican  peso crisis had  a sizable effect on movements  in output
and  domestic  interest  rate  spreads  in Argentina.
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11  Introduction
Argentina  faced a severe economic downturn  in 1995 and early 1996. Output,
domestic  credit,  and  stock  prices  fell dramatically.  A massive  shift  away
from peso-denominated  deposits was associated  with large capital  outflows, a
sharp drop in official foreign reserves and a contraction  of the monetary  base.
Unemployment peaked  at almost 19 percent  in May 1995 and remained  high
in subsequent  months.  The liquidity crunch led to a sharp rise in bank lending
rates,  on both  peso-  and  US dollar-denominated  loans.  At  the  same time,
the  spread  between  the  lending rates  on peso- and  US dollar-denominated
loans  widened  significantly  between  February  and  May  1995 (as shown  in
Figure  1),  reflecting  an  increase  in  the  perceived  risk  of a  collapse  of the
currency board  regime introduced  in 1991 and  a subsequent  large  exchange
rate  depreciation.  The  spread  between  deposit  and  lending  rates,  both  in
pesos and in US dollars, also increased sharply.
The timing  and severity of the economic downturn in Argentina  was asso-
ciated with an adverse external financial shock-an  abrupt  change in market
sentiment  regarding  the  country's  economic prospects,  triggered  by expec-
tations  that  the  currency  board  regime would  collapse.  Various  observers
attributed  this  phenomenon  to  a contagion  effect triggered  by the  Mexican
peso crisis of December 1994. Our analysis follows this perspective  and mod-
els contagion  as a temporary  increase in the risk premium  faced by domestic
borrowers on world capital  markets-that  is, an increase in external  interest
rate  spreads.  This  view is, of course,  also  consistent  with  a  more  general
interpretation  of external  shocks.  It is reflected  in the  sharp  increase  in in-
terest  rate  spreads  (relative to  US rates)  on liabilities issued  by private-as
well as public-borrowers  from Argentina  in the immediate  aftermath  of the
Mexican peso crisis  (Figure  1).  The  real  effects of this  shock are analyzed
both analytically  and empirically, in a model that  incorporates  a link between
bank  credit  and  the  supply side through  firms'  demand  for working  capital
(an important  feature  of Argentina's  financial system),  domestic interest  rate
2spreads,  and real lending rates.'
In general,  spreads  between lending  and  deposits  rates  in most  develop-
ing countries  tend  to  be relatively  large for a variety  of reasons-including
high  required  reserve ratios,  a  limited  degree  of competition  in  the  finan-
cial system,  low productive  efficiency of financial  institutions,  and  selective
credit  and  interest  controls  that  require  these  institutions  to  undertake  a
substantial  amount  of concessionary lending.  Several studies,  in particular,
have emphasized the  role of market  structure.2 In a recent  empirical  stucly
of the deterrninants  of bank spreads in Argentina,  for instance,  Catao  (1998)
found-using  aggregate monthly  data  for the  period June  1993-July 1997--
that  spreads are positively influenced by the degree of market  concentration.3
He interprets  this  result  as reflecting the  fact  that  most  peso  borrowers  in
Argentina  cannot  arbitrage  between domestic  and  foreign sources  of funds,
and  thus  become  subject  to  the  monopoly  power of local  banks.  He also
found  that  spreads  are also responsive  to  operating  costs  and  the  share  of
non-performing  loans,  and to a lesser degree exchange rate  risk  and the cost
of liquidity  requirements.  Our analysis,  by contrast,  focuses on the  role of
external  factors,  in  addition  to default  risk.  In contrast  to  existing  studies,
we focus on the role of domestic interest  rates in the transmission  process of
external shocks to output.
The remainder  of the paper  proceeds as follows. Section  II presents  the
'As documented for instance by Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1995), banks account for
between 50 and 90 percent of the financing needs of firms in Latin American countries.
Agenor (1998), Edwards and V6gh (1997), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), and Isard et al.
(1996) also develop models which explicitly account for the link between firms' working
capital needs and bank credit.
2Among recent studies of the determinants of bank spreads are Barajas, Steiner, and
Salazar (1998) for Colombia, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) for a large group of
countries.  Early studies include Ho and Sanders (1981), and Hanson and  de Resende
Rocha (1986).
3Catao uses, as we do in our empirical analsis, ex ante  (or contract) interest rates,
rather than  effective interest rates  (obtained from the income statements of commercial
banks). As is well known, these two measures can differ markedly in a setting where the
incidence of nonperforming loans is high and refinancing operations are widespread.
3analytical  framework,  which  describes the  determination  of domestic  bank
lending spreads  in the presence of verification and  enforcement  costs associ-
ated  with  loan contracts.  The analysis shows how domestic  financial  inter-
mediation  spreads  are related  to  default  probabilities,  underlying  domestic
shocks, and  external  spreads.  Section III  estimates  a vector  autoregression
model using monthly data for Argentina  (for the period June 1993-June 1998)
that  relates  the ex ante bank  lending spread,  the cyclical component  of out-
put,  the real bani  lending rate,  the  effective reserve requirement  ratio,  and
the  external  interest  rate  spread.  Generalized variance  decompositions  are
discussed  in Section  IV. Section V uses generalized  impulse  response  func-
tions  to  analyze the  effects of a contagious  shock, defined  as an increase  in
the external  spread.  Section VI assesses the movements in output  and inter-
est rates in Argentina  in the immediate aftermath  of the Mexican peso crisis
of December  1994. Section VII summarizes the  main results  of the  analysis
and offers some concluding remarks.
2  The  Analytical  Framework
The credit channel provides a key transmission mechanism of macroeconomic
shocks in developing countries.  This  channel  impacts  directly  on producers
who  finance  their  working  capital  needs  via  the  banking  system.  Banks
engage frequently  in  costly monitoring  and  supervision  of creditors'  perfor-
mance, to ensure  the proper  use of credit,  and  its timely  repayment.  As the
frequency of costly monitoring  increases in turbulent  times,  the credit  chan-
nel provides  a  natural  way to  model the  effects of macroeconomic  shocks
and volatility  on economic activity in developing countries.  This  section out-
lines a simplified version  of the  analytical  framework developed  by Ag6nor
and Aizenman  (1998, 1999), which highlights the impact  of productivity  and
external  cost of credit  shocks on domestic  output.4
4The  Agenor-Aizenman  framework  combines the  costly state  verification  approach  pi-
oneered  by Townsend  (1979) and  the  model  of limited  enforceability  of contracts  used  in
4We consider an economy where risk-neutral  banks provide intermediation
services.  Agents  (producers)  demand  credit  from banks  (lenders) to finance
their  working capital  needs.  Producers  who lack access to the equity  market
rely on bank  credit to finance the cost of variable inputs,  which must  be paid
prior  to  production  and  the  sale of output.  Output  is subject  to  random
productivity  shocks.  The  realized  productivity  shock is revealed  to  banks
only  at  a  cost.  In the  event  of default  by any  given producer  on its  bank
loans,  the  creditor  seizes a fraction  of the realized  value of output.  Seizing
involves two types  of costs:  first,  verifying the net value of output  is costly;
second, enforcing repayment  requires costly intervention  of the legal system.
Future  output  of producer  i is given by
yi  = M/(l  + 6o  + 6m±  + ei),  0 </3  <  1, Eil  <  r  <  1,  (1)
where  Mi  denotes  the  variable  input  (which  may  consist  of labor  or  raw
materials)  used  by producer  i,  Ei is the  realized  i.i.d.  productivity  shock,
1+60 is expected productivity,  and 6m is the realized common macroeconomic
shock, which is assumed to  distributed  binomially:
v  probability  0.5
°m =l
71  probability  0.5
The  contractual  interest  rate  on  loans  made  to  producer  i  is rL.  We
assume  that  each  producer  must  finance  variable  input  costs  prior  to  the
sale of output,  and  that  no one can issue claims on his or her  capital  stock.
Consequently, producer  i's  variable costs are (1 + r 4 )pmMi, where Pm is the
relative  price of the variable input.
We assume  that  the  bank  has information  about  the  input  choice of the
producer  and determines  the interest  rate such that  the expected  net repay-
ment  equals  the  cost  of credit.  Each  bank  is assumed  to  deal with  a large
the  external  debt  literature,  as  in  Eaton  et  al.  (1986),  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1989),  and
Helpman  (1989).
5number  of independent  producers,  allowing the  bank  to  diversify the  idio-
syncratic  risk, ei. Henceforth we also assume that  no default  would occur in
the good state  of the  macro shock, but  that  (at least)  some producers  will
default  partially  in the  bad  state  of the  aggregate shock.5 A producer  will
default  if
KMP(l + 8o  - v + Ei) < (1 + r  )pmMi,  (2)
where ic is the fraction of realized output  that  the bank is able to seize in case
of default.  The  left-hand  side of equation  (2)  is the  producer's  repayment
following a default,  whereas the right-hand  side is the contractual  repayment.
We denote  by E"?la  the highest  productivity  shock leading to  default-that
is, the value of Ei for which (2) holds as an equality:
zM  (I  + bo-  + £-  ) =  (1 + r?  )pmMi.  (3)
If default never occurs, eT"  is set at the lower end of the support  (£iax
-F).  In case of default,  the bank's  net  revenue is the producer's  repayment
niinus the  state  verification  and  contract  enforcement  cost,  assumed  to  be
proportional  to the cost of borrowed funds:6
zmA4(l +  En + E) -cipmMi(l +  r*),  (4)
where 0  < ci <  1.
5The key results of our discussion hold even if this  assumption is not valid.  This
assumption is equivalent to
KcMd(l  + 6o + v - r)  >  (I + ri)p",Mi  > KcMj(1  + 60 -vr),
and  will hold if the  degree of volatility of the aggregate shock (as measured by  v)  is
significant  enough.
6The  cost  ci is paid  by  banks  in  order  to  identify  the  productivity  shock  Ei, and  to
enforce proper  payment.  The analysis  is more involved if some costs are paid  after obtain-
ing the  information  about  Ei. In  these circumstances,  banks  will refrain  from forcing debt
repayment  when realized productivity  is below an  "enforcement  threshold."  For simplicity
of exposition,  we refrain  from  modeling this  possibility.  We ignore also all other  real costs
associated  with  financial  intermediation.  Adding  these  considerations  would  not  modify
the  key results  discussed  below.
6We assume  that  banks  have access to  an  elastic  supply  of funds,  at  a
real cost of r*. 7 Assuming that  banks are risk neutral  and  competitive,  the
contractual  interest  rate is determined  by an expected break-even  condition,
derived  in  Appendix  I.  As also shown there,  the  contractual  interest  rate,
r?,  is determined  by a  mark-up  rule.  r'  exceeds the  bank's  cost  of funds,
r*, by the  sum of two terms:  the  first  is the  expected  revenue lost  due  to
partial  default in bad  states of nature,  and the second measures the expected
state  verification  and  contract  enforcement costs. 8 In the  particular  case in
which the  aggregate  shock follows a uniform distribution,  the  spread  (A2)
is characterized  by a  quadratic  equation,  which can be  combined  with  (3)
to  derive a reduced-form  solution for the  probability  of default  and  for the
domestic interest  rate.
In general, the  domestic  interest  rate/external  cost of credit  curve, plot-
ted in the rE  -r* space, is backward-bending,  and a given r* can be associated
with two values of r4.  This follows from the presence of a trade-off  between
the interest  rate  and the  frequency of full repayment.9 The efficient point  is
associated with  the lower interest  rate,  as more frequent  default  is associated
with  a  lower expected  surplus  (see equation  (A4) in  Appendix  I).  Hence-
forth  we will assume  that  competitive  banks choose the  efficient point,  and
will ignore the  backward-bending  portion  of the  r4-r*  curve.  For  an inter-
nal solution where  credit  is supplied and  where the  probability  of default  is
positive, the  following proposition  can be shown to  hold:
Proposition  1  A  higher extermal cost of credit, r* raises  domestic  interest
rates and the bank lending spread, and reduces expected output.
7This  source of funds  may  be credit  provided  by foreign banks,  as  modeled  by Agenor
and  Aizenman  (1998).
8 Appendix  I  also  derives  the  producer's  expected  net  income,  and  indicates  that  the
optimal  level of use  of the  variable  input,  Mi, is found by maximnizing that  expression.
9A  higher  interest  rate  would  increase  the  probability  of  default,  implying  that  the
net  effect of a  higher interest  rate  on the  expected  repayment  is determined  by elasticity
considerations.
7As discussed in Appendix  I, the magnitude  of these effects increases with
the responsiveness of the domestic interest  rate to the cost of funds for banks,
ar4/Or*,  and  are maximized  as we approach the  backward-bending  portion
of the supply  of credit  facing producers.
3  VAR  Estimation  and  Analysis
We now apply the  analytical  framework developed  above to  an  analysis of
Argentina's  experience in the immediate  aftermath  of the  1994 Mexican peso
crisis. The model's explicit account of the role of external  financial shocks in
the determination  of domestic interest  rates and output  makes it particularly
suitable  for that  purpose.  To implement  our framework empirically  we use
vector autoregression  (VAR) techniques and focus on the following variables:
the  external  interest  rate  spread,  ES,  the  domestic  interest  rate  spread  on
peso-denominated  assets  and liabilities,  DS,  the real lending  rate,  RL,  and
two  alternative  measures  of output:  deviations  of current  output  from  its
trend  level, ln(y/yT),  and the growth rate  of output,  ln(y/y_1 2).  The trend
component  yT  is obtained  by applying  the Hodrick-Prescott  filter.  We refer
in what  follows to  the  model with  ln(y/yT)  as Model A, and  the  one with
ln(y/y-12)  as Model B.'0
Both models are estimated  with monthly data from January  1993 through
June  1998. In addition  to the variables listed above, we considered expanded
VAR models  with  the  average effective reserve requirement  rate,  in  an  at-
tempt  to  control  for changes in  the  cost  of financial  intermediation.'"  Al-
though  reserve requirement  rates  did change significantly during  the sample
1 0Appendix  II provides precise  data  definitions.  The results  of augmented  Dickey-Fuller
and  Phillips-Perron  unit  root  tests  are mixed  due to the relatively  short  time spun  by the
sample  period over which they  are done; the  series are taken,  nonetheless,  to be stationary
on economic grounds  (see Campbell  and  Perron,  1991).
1"Of course, various  other  factors  (such as changes in taxation  of financial  services) may
affect domestic  lending  spreads,  in addition  to  reserve  requirement  rates.  Our  analysis
implicitly  takes  these factors  as given.  This  assumption  is appropriate  to  the  extent  that
such factors  fluctuate  relatively  little  within  the  sample  period.
8period, the results  obtained  from this expanded model were not  qualitatively
different from the  those  obtained  from the  smaller version.  Given the  rela-
tively short  sample  size, we opted  to present  the  results  based  on the more
parsimonious  versions  of the  model.  The  number  of lags  included  in  the
estimated  models (as discussed in Appendix  II)  was set  to three  months.
To provide empirical  evidence on the analytical  framework,  we use gen-
eralized VAR techniques  that  are based  on reconsidering  what  impulse  re-
sponse functions  (IRFs)  and variance decompositions  are meant  to  uncover.
Koop,  Pesaran,  and  Potter  (1996) and  Pesaran  and  Shin  (1998) argue that
the  notion  of IRFs  (and  variance  decompositions)  should  be  re-examined,
and  proposed  to  change the  focus from  "pure"  structural  shocks identified
by orthogonalizing  VAR innovations,  to an  understanding  of what  a histor-
ical innovations  suggests  about  the  dynamics  in the  data.  Typically,  these
historical innovations  are not  orthogonal  but,  contrary  to  standard  VAR re-
gression residuals  (or innovations),  they  embody the  full information  of the
contemporaneous  correlation  of these  residuals.  This  makes them  particu-
larly  useful  for studying  the  implications  of the  analytical  framework  pre-
sented  above; using standard  VAR techniques  would require  in the  present
context  arbitrary  timing  assumptions  about  the  contemporaneous  interac-
tions  between the  variables.  Although  our  model does suggest  that  shocks
to external spreads  should be considered first in the ordering of the variables
in a standard  VAR system,  it does not  lend itself to  a natural  ordering for
the remaining ones, because they are jointly  determined.  Moreover, as noted
below, the  historical  shocks to  the  external  spread  are  numerically  equiva-
lent  to  the  standard  VAR innovations  when  the  external  spread  is placed
first in the  ordering.  A further  consideration  is that  generalized  IRFs  (and
generalized variance  decompositions)  are unique,  that  is, not  subject  to  or-
dering/compositional  effects of standard  orthogonal  analysis.
To illustrate  generalized VAR analysis, consider the moving average rep-
resentation  of the  a VAR model:
9Zt  = C(L)-'pt,  (5)
where Zt =  [ESt, DSt,  RLt, ln(yt/yT)] and It  is distributed  (multivariate)
normal, that is, N(O,  Q). This implies that  Zt is also normal with zero mean
and covariance matrix C(L)-'QC(L)-`'.  Rather than  orthogonalizing the
VAR innovations in equation (5), generalized VAR analysis considers the
conditional expectation of Zt given a specific  shock to pt.
For the sake of argument, consider the generalized (or average) effect on
Zt of the historical shock that is of particular interest in this study, a shock to
the ESt, specifically  IESt.  This effect is obtained by taking the expectation
of equation  (5) conditional  on the shock IES,t  =  VI
GIR(Zt,  Est  =  V)  =  E[Zt  I
1ES,t  = V,Q]=  C(L)-1 E[u  I  IES,t  =  VI ],
and given the properties of the multivariate normal distribution:
GIR(Zt, PESt =  V)  =  C(L)  'QES  CES,ES  V,  (6)
where  QESis  the column of Q corresponding  to ES, and OES,ESis  the variance
of the innovation in ES.  Note that  although v could be any value, it seems
natural to set it equal to its historical value: the standard  error of the ES
shock,  cES,ES-
In general, the GIR in equation (6) will differ from the standard impulse
responses.  However, the  GIR in  (6) will be numerically equivalent to the
Choleski  decompositions  when the ES is placed first in the ordering, or in the
special case when the innovations  in pt  are mutually orthogonal. Aside from
these numerical equivalencies, generalized VAR analysis is a conceptually
different construct.  Generalized VAR analysis is intended to  reveal to the
analyst how the  VAR model behaves following  a specific historical shock.
Likewise, generalized variance decompositions are intended to  provide the
"share" of the movements  of a specific  series  associated  with historical shocks.
Neither generalized IRFs nor generalized  variance decompositions intend to
10uncover the  effect of "structural"  shocks as in standard  VAR analysis,  and
thus  historical  shocks  are not  orthogonal.  In  this  sense,  generalized  VAR
analysis provides  "stylized facts"  about  the  VAR model that  fully accounts
from the dynamics and historical correlations present in the data,  that  in turn
can be  compared  to  the  predictions  of the  analytical  framework  discussed
above.  Note  that  the  fact  that  the  generalized  shocks  are not  orthogonal
implies  that  the  variance  decompositions  do  not  generally  add  up  to  100
percent.
4  Generalized  Variance  Decompositions
Table  1 presents  the  generalized  variance  decompositions  (GVDs)  for  the
variables in the  system,  for both  models.  At a forecast  horizon of less than
twelve months,  movements  in the  external  spread  are  primarily  associated
with their  own historical shocks for both  models. At longer forecast horizons,
historical shocks associated  the domestic spread play a more substantial  role
in both  cases; in addition,  movements in output  play a greater  role in model
A. These results are consistent with the analytical  framework presented  above
and  the  extended  framework  developed  by  Ag6nor and  Aizenman  (1998),
in  which  external  spreads  have  an  endogenous  component-reflecting  the
probability  of default  of domestic  producers  on their  liabilities  to  domestic
banks  and  the  risk  of domestic  banks  defaulting  on  their  foreign  loans.'2
More generally, the  results  obtained  with  Model A are also consistent  with
the  view that  domestic  economic conditions  affect  movements  in  external
spreads  through  their  effect on market  sentiment  or expectations.
At short  horizons,  movements of domestic  spreads  are also greatly  influ-
enced by their own historical shocks in both models.  At a forecast horizon of
12Note also that  the analytical framework predicts that shocks to output and domestic
spreads are correlated, because the latter variable reflects the probability of default (which
is itself related to output shocks). Recall, however, that  since generalized VAR analysis
focuses  on nonorthogonal shocks, it is not valid to add up their shares to obtain a measure
of their combined effect.
11less than six months, these shocks  explain the bulk of the movements  in DS.
At longer forecast horizons (beyond 6 months), historical shocks to the real
lending rate play a greater role in explaining  these movements, again in both
models. In addition, this is also true for the external spread and movements
in output  in Model A-with  each accounting for about the  same share of
the movements in the domestic spread at a horizon of 24 months.  Again,
these results are consistent with the theoretical framework discussed above
and our main proposition; shocks  to both external spreads and output affect
the capacity of domestic firms  to repay, thereby raising banks' perceived risk
of default.
As is the  case with external and domestic spreads, movements in out-
put are mostly explained by their own historical shocks at forecast horizons
less than six months in both models, explaining in excess of 75 percent of
its movements. At longer forecast horizons, historical shocks for both mod-
els associated with  the external spread play a substantial  secondary role,
accounting between 20 to 25 percent of cyclical movements in output at a
forecast horizon of 24 months. Shocks  to domestic spreads explain a similar
portion of movements in output in Model B but  account for about half as
much as shocks to external spreads in Model A. A rather  puzzling fact is
that shocks to the real lending rate account for a relatively small proportion
of cyclical  movements in output in both models. 13 One possible explanation
is that our index of output (industrial production) reflects essentially output
of traded goods; to the extent that producers of traded goods have a greater
access to world capital markets (because of their  ability to  post collateral
in foreign currency terms), one would expect a limited effect of the cost of
borrowing on domestic capital markets.
Movements  in the real lending rate in both models are greatly influenced
by their own historical shocks at all horizons, explaining in excess of 80 per-
'3We attempted  to  measure  the  real  lending  rate  by using  various  proxies  for  the  ex-
pected  inflation  rate  (lagged,  current  and  one-period  ahead  actual  values).  This  did  not
change  significantly  our  results.
12cent of its movements.  Shocks to domestic spreads and to the real lending rate
play a secondary  and tertiary  role respectively in accounting  for movements
in the real lending rate,  accounting respectively  about  15 and  10 percent  of
the movements  in the real lending rate  and shocks to the  cycle.
5  External  Spread  Shock
Figures  2 and  3 show the  generalized impulse responses  (GIRs) for the vari-
ables of the two models to  a positive historical shock in the external  spread.
As discussed in the introduction,  this experiment  can be viewed as one way of
capturing  "pure"  (expectations-related)  contagion effects, triggered  by events
taking  place elsewhere in the  region or the  world.  Of course,  as also noted
earlier, a more general interpretation  of this  experiment  is possible; it can be
viewed simply  as reflecting  an  adverse external  financial  shock-related  or
not to  contagion.
GIRs and  their  one-standard  error bands  are shown for each variable.'4
As  indicated  earlier,  GIRs  are obtained  as the  conditional  distribution  of
each shock  in  the  system  and  thus  provide the  dynamic  responses  of the
variables in the VAR model that  accounts for all of the historical  information
in the  data  sample.  As illustrated  in  equation  (6), the  GIR to  an  external
spread  shock shows the evolution  of variables in the model  corresponding  to
"historically  correct"  shock to  external  spreads  that  explicitly  accounts  for
all the  contemporaneous  movements  of the  other  shocks in the  model.  As
noted in Section III, this  is numerically equivalent to the traditional  Choleski
decomposition  when  the  external  spread  "moves first,"  that  is,  when  the
external spread  shock occurs before other shocks.
"4In all figures the dotted  lines for the GIRs show one standard  error band in each
direction and are based on 1000  Monte Carlo replications. In each replication we sampled
the VAR coefficients  and  the covariance  matrix from their posterior distribution.  riom
these replications we calculated the square root of the mean squared deviation from the
impulse response in each direction.  By construction, these bands  contain the  impulse
response function but are not necessarily  symmnetric.
13As  shown  in  the  figures,  a  one-standard  deviation  shock  to  external
spreads of roughly  120 basis points leads in the next period to an increase in
the  domestic  spread  by only about  20 basis points  in  both  cases.  Whereas
the  response  of the  external  spread  lasts just  over  a year,  the  response  of
the  domestic  spread  lasts  for about  half  as long.  The  first  finding  is con-
sistent  with  an  extended  version  of the  model  presented  in  Section  II to
account for two  levels of financial intermediation,  along the lines of Agenor
and  Aizenman  (1998).  In that  paper,  the  process  of financial  intermedia-
tion  is viewed as consisting  of two stages:  foreign banks  provide  credit  to
domestic  banks,  and  domestic  banks  provide the intermediation  services to
domestic  investors.  The  analysis shows that  each  spread  is determined  by
similar  considerations-it  equals  the  expected  revenue  lost  due  to  partial
default,  and  the  cost of financial intermediation,  at the  given level of inter-
mediation.  This  extended  model can explain  the finding reported  above, if
the exogenous shock to the external spread indicates that  the likelihood of ex-
ternal  default  increases by more than  the likelihood of internal  default.  This
may be the case if the shock is due to contagion associated  with  asymmetric
information-that  is, if Argentina's  perceived country risk by foreign lenders
increased  by more than  the riskiness  of business  in Argentina  for domestic
lenders.
Movements in  output  become  significantly negative  after  2 months  and
display a degree of persistence  that  is similar to that  observed for the external
spread  in both  cases." 5 The response of the real lending rate  is positive  but
'5Note that  on impact  in Model A, the response of the cyclical component of output
is a perverse blip that  is reversed very quickly. As noted in Section III, generalized IRFs
embody the full information of the contemporaneous correlation in the VAR innovations
and consequently and contrary to standard IRF's, none of these correlation are set to zero.
Recall that generalized  IRFs are numerically  equivalent  to traditional Choleski IRFs when
the variable of interest is place first in the ordering. In this context, the perverse output
blip on "impact" essentially reflects the positive contemporaneous  correlation between the
VAR innovations in ES  and those in ln(y/yT)  during the sample period (see Table Al)
that  is "picked  up" by the generalized  IRFs. Note, however,  that  this perverse blip is not
observed with Model B.
14imprecisely measured.  The initial  rise in that  variable is consistent  with  an
increase in the  domestic  spread  that  is brought  about  through  a rise in the
nominal lending rate  that  exceeds the rise in the  nominal  deposit rate,  with
inflation displaying some degree of inertia on impact.  Alternatively,  it is also
consistent  with  a  situation  in  which the  fall in  the  cyclical  component  of
output  leads not  only to  a drop in both  domestic rates  (with  the fall in the
nominal deposit rate  exceeding the fall in the nominal lending rate)  but  also
to a drop in inflation, associated  with  a contraction  in aggregate  demand.
6  The  Aftermath  of  the  Peso  Crisis:  A  His-
torical  Decomposition
A useful application  of the generalized VAR models estimated  above is to as-
sess the movements in output  and domestic interest  rate spreads in Argentina
in the  immediate  aftermath  of the  Mexican  peso crisis  of December  1994.
This  can be  done  by using the  historical  decompositions  of these  variables
for the  period  immediately  following the  collapse of the  peso,  specifically,
from January  1995 to  the  end  of 1996.  T-able 2 presents  these  results  on  a
quarterly  basis (obtained  by averaging over the monthly  decompositions)  for
both  models.
The results  for both  models indicate  that  the fall in output  in the second
quarter  of 1995 (by about  3 percent  with  respect  to trend  in Model A, and
by about  6 percent  at  an  annual  rate  in  Model  B) was  mostly  associated
with the  adverse effect of higher external  spreads-a  result  that  is consistent
with our  analytical  framework.  This  effect persists  until  the first  quarter  of
1996 in  both  cases-although  the  effect of shocks to  output  itself  become
important  after the second quarter  of 1995.
Regarding  the  domestic  spread,  the  conditional  forecasts  of the  models
(based  on information  available up to  December  1994) appear  to  track  the
data fairly closely for the period under consideration.  The results  also suggest
15that  for the  first  half of  1995, external  spread  shocks raised  the  domestic
spread  by about  0.7 percentage  points,  compared  to  about  1.3 for domestic
spread  shocks.  Note  that  during  the  same  period,  the  effect  of external
spread  shocks are twice as large as those  of output  shocks, and  almost four
times  as  large  as  shocks to  the  real  lending  rate.  The  relatively  limited
impact  of external  spread  shocks on the  domestic  lending rate  is consistent
with  the  possibility  that  credit  rationing  translates  into  larger  movements
in the  volume  of credit,  as  opposed to  prices.  However, in  the  absence of
disaggregated  data  on  credit  flows and  pools  of borrowers  (based  on their
creditworthiness,  for instance),  it  is hard  to  assess the  importance  of this
effect.  Nevertheless,  it remains  true that  during  the first  part  of 1995 (that
is, in  the  immediate  aftermath  of the  Mexican  peso),  external  shocks had
sizable effects on the behavior of output  and  domestic bank  lending spreads
in Argentina.16
7  Summary  and  Conclusions
The purpose  of this  paper  has been  to study  the  effects of external  shocks
on  domestic  bank  lending  spreads  and  output  fluctuations  in  Argentina.
The analytical  framework, which was presented  in Section  II,  analyzed the
determination  of bank  lending  spreads  in  the  presence  of verification  and
enforcement  costs  of  loan contracts.  Section  III  presented  estimates  of a
vector  autoregression  system  that  relates  the  ex ante  bank  lending  spread,
movements in output  (measured  as deviations  of output  from trend  and the
growth rate  of output),  the real bank  lending rate,  and  the external  interest
rate  spread.  Generalized  variance decompositions,  presented  in  Section IV,
showed in particular,  that  at short horizons  (less than  6 months)  movements
of domestic spreads  are greatly  influenced by their  own historical  shocks.  At
16Note also that  movements  in output  in this  context  can be  consistent  with  a demand
channel.  Again, identifying  more precisely the supply-side  effects emphasized  in this  paper
would require  more disaggregated  data.
16longer forecast horizons,  the  external  spread  and the  cyclical component  of
output  played a  greater  role in explaining these  movements.  The  effects of
an external  shock, modeled as a positive historical shock in external  interest
rate  spreads,  were analyzed in Section V using generalized  impulse response
functions.  The results  indicated  that  such a shock led to  an  increase in do-
mestic spreads  and  a reduction  in the  cyclical component  of output.  Both
results  are consistent  with the predictions  of our analytical  framework.  The
results  also showed that  the response of the  domestic spread  with  respect  to
the foreign spread  is well below one; we argued that  this  prediction  is con-
sistent  with  an  extended  version of the  model presented  here  (Ag6nor and
Aizenman,  1998).  Finally,  Section VI used the  generalized  VAR models to
assess the  effects of historical  shocks to  external  spreads  on movements  in
output  and  domestic interest  rate  spreads in Argentina  in the immediate  af-
termath  of the Mexican peso crisis of December  1994. The results  indicated
that  such shocks played an important  role in the behavior  of these variables.
The  experience  of the  emerging  markets  in  the  nineties  provides  new
challenges for economists,  requiring  us to  reassess our  understanding  of the
transmission  mechanism  from  financial  markets  to  real  economic activity.
The empirical results  of our paper  are consistent  with the notion  that  finan-
cial volatility  has  adverse consequences in economies where  banks  and  debt
contracts  are widely used to  finance investment.  Our results  provide tenta-
tive support  for the  predictions  of models based  upon  the  notion  of costly
financial intermediation.  Further  research is needed to  validate  these results
for other  countries,  and to identify their  policy implications.
17Appendix  I
The  Bank  Lending  Spread
and  the  Effect  of an External  Shock
As  noted  in  the  text,  we assume  that  banks  have  access to  an  elastic
supply  of funds,  at  a  real  cost  of r*.  With  competitive  and  risk-neutral
banks,  the  contractual  interest  rate  is determined  by  the  expected  break-
even condition:17
(1 + r')pmMi  +0.5  {(  ± 4)pmMj  + j[(I  + r)pmMi]f  (e)de  (Al)
+ X  [M~(1  + 6o  - v + e) - cjpmMj(l + r)]f  (e)de
where  f (e) is the  density  function.  Using  (3)  and  (Al),  the  interest  rate
spread  can be shown to  be given by
ImO  a  xm
0.5 fr  [KMi(ET  - E)]f(e)de  + 0.5cipmMi(l  + r*) f  f (e)de
L  PmMi  PmMi
(A2)
The  contractual  interest  rate,  ri ,  is determined  by a  mark-up  rule.  rL
exceeds the  bank's  cost  of funds,  r*, by the  sum  of two  terms:  the  first  is
the expected revenue lost due to partial  default  in bad  states  of nature,  and
the second measures the expected state  verification and contract  enforcement
costs.
The producer's  expected net income equals
(I+±8)Mi  -0.5  (  [  (±'  +  60  2JM]f(  )  (A3)
Using (Al),  we can simplify (A3) to
(1 +  -o)Mi  -(1  + r*)pmMi - 0.5cipmMi(l  + r*)  f (e)de.  (A4)
"In  what  follows we drop  the  subscript  i on E to simplify  notations.
18The optimal level of use of the variable input,  Mi, is found by maximizing
(A4).
In  the  particular  case in  which  the  aggregate  shock  follows a  uniform
distribution,  -F  <  E < r,  the  spread  (A2) is characterized  by a  quadratic
equation,  given by
4-r*=217  +ci(l+r*)4  i,  (A5)
where 4i  =  (F + E£aT)/4F is the probability of default.  Combining the above
equation  with  (3) one can infer a reduced  form solution  for the  probability
of default  and for the  domestic interest  rate.
To establish  the  derivations  in Proposition  I proceeds  as follows.  Using
(3) and  (A5), we infer that  the probability  of default  is determined  by
2FVr_I[fiP2  +  {ci(l  + r*)pmMi - 4KMiF}  1. + (±  + r*)pmMi  (A6)
=rlM(i(+  6o-V-r)  =o-.
This  is  a  quadratic  equation,  yielding  2  interest  rates  in  the  relevant
range.  Henceforth  we assume that  competitive  forces induces banks  to offer
the lower interest  rate,  leading to  a probability  of default  of
=  H4-  M  r'  (A7)
where
H = 4rMf  -c,i(I  + r*)pmMi,  Z-H 2 - 8rMPFA,
A =  (I + r*)pmM,  - rMi(l  + bo  -v-
Using (A6) and  (3), we infer that
dr'/dr*  = 4,VMr/  Z.  (A8)
19Hence, we operate  on the up ward-slopping portion  of the supply  of credit
as long as H  >  a/  and Z  > 0.  VWe approach the  backward-bending  part  of
the curve as Z  -O  0. Henceforth  we assume that  this  condition  holds.
The  first-order  condition  determining  the demand  for the variable  input
is inferred from (A4) as
dM  = (I +  &o)3MA-'  -(1  + r')pcj['jMi±  -= 0.  (A9)
dMi  ZaMi
Applying  the  implicit  function  theorem  to  (A9),  and  using  the  second
order-condition  for profits maximization,  we infer that
dMVI  d2R/(dxdMi)  d2H
sgl dT*  g 9 d2Ud  I  =  g  (_AlO) S9[  dr*  ]--  d25-~aSlrI/dM/X2  |=sdr-d  -1  (l10
This result implies that,  to establish that  dMi/dr*  < O, it suffices to show
that  d211/(dxdMi)  < 0.  Applying  (A9) we infer that
d 21  (1 ±  0'MIIa)
dr*dM~  i =-(  r  °+*  i  _  (1  + r*)pmc4,  i  +  MWj(  --- )]  (All)
Applying  (A7), and  collecting terms,  it follows thrat
- M  [1 (+)c  i  H  )]  Mi (I +  ciDO  (A12)
Or  1Z_  4r,.lft  vZ-
(1  + (1O-)Cc(I'  M_At  Z/&amJ)  (  Ci  (  I  -*)ci
d3aNr - X2ZVZ  4KiM.r  P  :7'  4niVr
Thus,
94i  +  Mt  0
ar*  a Milar*
M'  {2  - (2 - 3)cjbP  + c4,  _  (1 +  r*)ci,  _  Mj(OZ/1aM)  [I +  ciH 
Using (A7) it can be shown that  Mj(aZ/aOIW)/2Z <  1 and cjH/4i￿,Pr  >
ci4i.  Applying  these 2 results  to the  above equation  it can be verified that
a'D  i+Mi(  Ha2i  )>O, Or*  OMiOr*)
20from which we infer that,  indeed, d2ll/dr*dMi < 0.  An Appendix  (available
upon  request)  establishes  that  lower expected  productivity,  6o, and  higher
volatility  of macroeconomic shocks, v, raise domestic  interest  rates  and  the
bank  lending spread,  and reduces expected output.
21Appendix  II
Data  Sources and VAR Estimation
Data.  The data used in this study are at a monthly frequency and cover
the period 1993:M6-1998:M6.  The variables are measured as follows: 18
* ES  is the external spread of Brady par bonds over U.S. Treasury bills.
The series is virtually indistinguishable from spreads on Brady dis-
counted bonds, and its movements  are highly correlated with external
spread on sovereign  bonds (as shown in Figure 1). Data were obtained
from Merryll Lynch.
n  DS  is calculated as the difference  between the  nominal lending rate
on peso-denominated loans and the deposit rate on peso-denominated
deposits.  The series were obtained from the Fund's International Fi-
nancial Statistics (line 60p and line 601) and from Catao (1998).
* RL is calculated as the norninal  lending rate on peso-denominated  loans
at a monthly rate minus monthly inflation, measured by the consumer
price index.  Raw series were obtained from the Fund's  International
Financial Statistics. (lines 60p and 64)
*  ln(y/yT) measures  deviations  of industrial output, y, from trend, YT.  YT
is estimated with the Hodrick-Prescott  filter, using a value of A  = 16000
for the smoothing  parameter.  ln(y/y_12)  is the  growth  rate  of output.
The industrial output index was obtained from FIEL.
VAR estimation.  To determine the number of lags to  include in the
VAR models, we started  by calculating standard  lag-length tests,  that  is
Akaike  Information Criteria (AIC), Hannan-Quinn (HQ), and Schwarz. These
18The  effective  reserve  requirement  rate,  which  was  used  in  our  preliminary  ex-
periements,  was calculated  by subtracting  line 14a  in the  Fund's  International  Financial
Statistics  from line 14 and  dividing  by the  sum of lines 24 and  25, minus line 14a.
22tests  compare the  cost  of increasing the lag length  (reduced  degrees of free-
dom)  to the  benefit  (increased information  extraction  from the  data).  Using
a maximum lag length of six, all three tests  suggested using six. This presents
a problem  due to the  size of the sample:  using the six lags means that  each
of the five equations  would contain  31 (6*5+1) coefficients to estimate  with
66 monthly  observations  (January  1993-June  1998).  This  translates  into
unacceptably  low degrees of freedom and  consequently  low precision  in the
estimation.  Rather  using the six lags as suggested by the tests,  we use three
lags based  on two considerations.  First,  it  is the smallest  lag length  where
the reduced-form  innovations  are white noise judging  by Ljung-Box Q tests
for serial  correlation  (up  to  order  12).  This  ensures  that  the  white  noise
assumption  implicit  in the estimation  procedure  is not  violated.  Second and
more importantly,  the GIRs and GVDs using three  lags are qualitatively  the
same  as those  using six lags.  Thus,  using the  shorter  lags  does not  affect
the  main  qualitatively  results  presented  in  the paper.  Table  Al  presents  a
summary of the estimated  VAR equations that  underlie the empirical results
in the paper.
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11 The vertical line corresponds  to the Mexican peso crisis (December  20, 1994).Figure 2.  Generalized Impulse Responses, Model A.
(Historical  Shock  to the External  Spread)
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Note: The  impulse  responses  were  obtained  from  a VAR model  with four  variables:  the external spread,  the  domestic  spread,  output (deviation  from
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trend  output. The  shock  to the external  spread  equals  the  standard  deviation  of its VAR  innovation,  120  basis  points. The  VAR  model  is estimated
with  three  lags  using  monthly  data  from 1993:M  I through  1998:M6.  One  standard  error  band  in each  dihection  are  based  on 1,000  Monte  Carlo
replications.  See  appendix  for  details.Figure 3.  Generalized Impulse Responses, Model B.
(Historical  Shock  to the  External  Spread)
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1  993:MI through 1998:M6. One standard error bands in each direction are based on 1,000  Monte Carlo replications.  See appendix
for details.Table I. Generalized  Vaiance Decompositions
Model A  Model B
External Spread (ES)  External Spread (ES)
Months  Percentage  of tbe variance associated  with  Percentage  of the variance associated with
historical  shocksto  historical  shocks to
ES  DS  ln(y/YT)  RL  ES  DS  ln(yey, 12)  RL
I  100.0  0.4  2.9  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.8  0.4
2  99.5  - 0.4  5.2  0.1  98.6  0.3  0.5  0.2
3  95.9  1.5  3.8  1.8  92.8  2.0  4.5  3.1
6  92.8  5.0  6.1  1.3  89.2  6.7  3.6  2.2
9  87.4  8.2  8.4  1.1  83.3  11.9  2.9  2.1
12  81.4  10.3  10.3  1.6  76.9  16.0  2.5  2.6
24  70.5  11.2  12.2  4.7  61.8  20.8  1.9  6.7
Cyclical Component of Output (In(y/yT))  Output Growth (In(ydyt_12))
Percentage of the variance associated  with  Percentage  of the vanance associated with
historical  shocks to  historical  shocks to
ES  DS  1n(yIy-)  RL  ES  DS  In(yVytY12)  RL
1  2.9  0.4  100.0  5.7  0.8  0.0  100.0  9.2
2  2.8  3.0  94.1  6.1  1.4  0.0  96.1  9.9
3  2.6  5.1  87.6  10.0  2.7  2.9  92.4  9.4
6  9.7  5.9  78.2  9.5  15.5  11.2  72.6  7.2
9  19.1  8.0  68.3  8.5  23.3  19.8  55.3  5.8
12  24.8  10.3  61.4  7.5  25.6  25.4  43.6  5.8
24  25.2  12.5  53.0  8.6  20.9  30.1  28.0  10.7
Domestic Spread (DS)  Domestic  Spread (DS)
Percentage of the variance associated  with  Percentage of the variance associated with
historical  shocks to  historical  shocks to
ES  DS  Iln(y/yT)  RL  ES  DS  In(yt/yu 1 2)  RL
1  0.4  100.0  0.4  13.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  10.5
2  4.1  93.9  3.6  11.3  3.5  92.3  1.8  8.6
3  6.5  76.2  4.0  14.0  6.3  75.9  2.6  13.6
6  9.0  60.9  8.6  12.4  5.9  67.6  2.2  13.3
9  8.4  51.2  11.0  14.5  5.2  61.2  1.7  15.6
12  7.4  45.9  11.9  16.8  4.5  56.9  1.5  17.8
24  11.6  40.6  11.3  18.7  5.0  50.9  1.4  21.0
Real  Lending Rate (RL)  Real Lending  Rate (RL)
Percentage  of the variance associated with  Percentage  of the variance associated with
historical  shocks to  historical  shocks to
ES  DS  In(yJyT)  RL  ES  DS  ln(yVyt  l2)  RL
I  0.0  13.0  5.7  100.0  0.4  10.5  9.2  100.0
2  0.1  12.6  8.7  98.6  0.5  10.6  10.5  99.2
3  0.7  14.0  9.0  93.2  1.3  12.6  13.9  91.2
6  1.1  16.0  9.7  90.4  1.4  15.1  14.6  88.3
9  1.4  17.0  10.2  87.8  1.5  16.7  14.2  85.9
12  1.4  17.2  10.4  86.1  1.5  17.4  13.9  84.2
24  2.0  16.9  10.4  84.2  1.6  17.7  13.3  82.1
Note These decompositions  are based on the genealized VAR analysis following  Koop, Pesaran  and
Potter (1996) who propose to consider non-orthogonal  historical shocks. Consequently the variance
decompositions  do not add up to 100 percent The variance decompositions  are obtained from VAR models
comprised  by the following variables: ES, DS, In(y/yT) in Model A and ln(ytfyt-12)  in Model B, and RL.
The  model is estimated with three lags  using monthly data from 1993:MI through 1998:M6; see Appendix 11
for details.Table 2. Generalized Historical Decompositions
Model A  Model B
Quarter  Cyclical Component of Output (ln(y/yT))  Output Growth (ln(yt/yt-  12))
Actual  Model  Associated with historical shocks to:  Actual  Model  Associated with historical shocks to:
projection  ES  DS  In(Y/YT)  RL  projection  ES  DS  ln(Yt/yt  12)  RL
1995:Q1  0.064  0.015  0.016  0.003  0.036  0.011  0.043  0.028  -0.007  -0.004  0.011  0.004
1995:Q2  -0.031  -0.004  -0.035  -0.004  0.016  -0.009  -0.063  0.017  -0.048  -0.028  0.003  0.000
1995:Q3  -0.089  -0.010  -0.030  -0.013  -0.032  -0.010  -0.109  0.020  -0.042  -0.053  -0.025  -0.005
1995:Q4  -0.104  -0.009  -0.024  -0.017  -0.053  -0.004  -0.128  0.030  -0.034  -0.065  -0.055  0.004
1996:Q1  -0.029  -0.004  -0.026  -0.018  0.021  0.004  -0.075  0.043  -0.031  -0.067  -0.028  0.019
1996:Q2  0.003  0.003  -0.010  -0.025  0.035  -0.007  0.058  0.056  -0.005  -0.068  0.059  0.011
1996:Q3  -0.020  0.010  -0.007  -0.031  -0.012  0.003  0.101  0.068  0.002  -0.064  0.065  0.016
1996:Q4  -0.031  0.016  -0.001  -0.020  -0.041  0.015  0.114  0.078  0.000  -0.041  0.047  0.033
Domestic Spread (DS)  Domestic Spread (DS)
Actual  Model  Associated with historical shocks to:  Actual  Model  Associated with historical shocks to:
projection  ES  DS  In(y/yT)  RL  projection  ES  DS  ln(yt.yt-12)  R1
1995:QI  0.190  0.167  0.006  0.014  0.001  0.004  0.190  0.163  0.006  0.016  0.002  0.004
1995:Q2  0.186  0.165  0.008  0.012  0.005  0.001  0.186  0.159  0.005  0.023  -0.001  0.000
1995:Q3  0.172  0.161  0.003  0.010  0.005  -0.005  0.172  0.155  0.002  0.018  -0.001  -0.005
1995:Q4  0.162  0.156  0.002  0.013  -0.001  -0.006  0.162  0.152  0.002  0.015  0.000  -0.006
1996:Ql  0.150  0.152  -0.004  0.016  -0.005  -0.005  0.150  0.149  -0.005  0.014  0.001  -0.003
1996:Q2  0.145  0.150  -0.005  0.012  0.000  -0.010  0.145  0.147  -0.003  0.015  0.000  -0.009
1996:Q3  0.133  0.148  -0.005  -0.004  0.003  -0.011  0.133  0.146  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.010
1996:Q4  0.132  0.148  -0.005  -0.004  0.000  -0.006  0.132  0.145  -0.002  -0.005  -0.002  -0.006
Note: These historical decompositions are calculated by averaging the monthly decompositions using generalized VAR analysis.  The VAR model projections
are obtained as dynamic forecasts of the models conditional on information up to December 1994. Since historical shocks are not orthogonal, the model
projections and the effects associated with each historical shock do not add up to the actual series.Table Al.  VAR Estimates, Monthly Observations  from January 1993  to June 1998.
Model A  ES  DS  ln(y/yT)  RRL
Coefficient  of  Determination  (R 2)  0.883  0.788  0.524  0.326
Adjusted R2 0.852  0.731  0.397  0.146
Sum of Squared  Errors  84.094  54.854  832.493  7.059
Standard  Error of Estimate  1.367  1.104  4.301  0.396
Significance  of Lagged  Regressors:
External Spread  64.582 *  0.810  1.494  0.111
Domestic Spread  1.474  30.049 *  1.316  1.325
Output  0.707  1.676  2.804 *  0.505
Real Lending Rate  2.148  3.596 *  1.214  3.105
Correlation  with the VAR innovations of:
External Spread  1.450  0.062  0.171  0.011
Domestic  Spread  0.946  0.059  0.361
Output  14.353  0.239
Real Lending Rate  0.  L  22
Tests for Serial Correlation:
Breusch-Godfrey  64.89  52.62  9.95  8.84
Ljung-Box  Q  91.93  97.12  54.63  56.71
Model B  ES  DS  ln(y/y 1 .12)  RL
Coefficient  of  Determination  (R2)  0.902  0.776  0.714  0.339
Adjusted R 2 0.876  0.717  0.637  0.163
Sum of Squared Errors  0.007  0.006  0.108  0.001
Standard  Error of Estimate  0.013  0.011  0.049  0.004
Significance  of Lagged Regressors:
Extemal Spread  61.986 *  1.001  1.843  0.133
Domestic Spread  1.693  33.823 *  1.708  1.422
Output  3.710 *  0.837  5.458 *  0.819
Real Lending Rate  1.487  3.116 *  0.721  2.839
Correlation  with the VAR innovations  of:
External Spread  1.217  0.009  -0.087  -0.064
Domestic Spread  0.996  -0.016  0.323
Output  18.555  0.304
Real Lending Rate  0.119
Tests for Serial Correlation:
Breusch-Godfrey  35.59  38.15  1.34 *  18.35
Ljung-Box Q  89.21  97.03  34.00  11.58
Note: The VAR models are estimated with three lags. The significance  tests are F-tests for the joint significance of all
of the lags of the corresponding  variable; these tests have respectively  three and 53 degrees of freedom in the
numerator and the denominator. The tests for serial correlation  test for serial correlations of up to order 12. An
asterisk  (*) denotes significant  rejection of the respective  null hypothesis at the five percent significance level.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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